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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1863 to combat
fraud during the Civil War.1 Since its enactment, the FCA has
served as the federal government’s primary tool for imposing lia-
bility on persons and organizations who defraud government pro-
grams.2 Recently, the government ramped up FCA enforcement,
prioritizing FCA claims in specific industries, including health care,
where the ability to defraud is prevalent and cost recovery is sig-
nificant.3
Since 1986, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has recovered more
than $56 billion from civil FCA enforcement actions.4 In 2017 alone,
the DOJ recovered more than $3.7 billion; $2.4 billion of this re-
covery stemmed directly from the health care industry, marking the
eighth consecutive year that health care recoveries have totaled over
$2 billion.5 One health care company paid a settlement of $145
million after allegations surfaced that its skilled nursing facilities
had submitted claims for services that were unreasonable and un-
necessary.6 A health records software company paid $155 million
after allegations that it falsely obtained certification for its soft-
ware.7 While the FCA aids the federal government in recovering
1. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976) (“The Act was originally
aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the
Civil War.”); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 321 (Lawrence M.
Salinger ed., 2d ed. 2013); see also United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (“The
[FCA] was originally adopted following a series of sensational congressional investigations
into the sale of provisions and munitions.... Testimony ... painted a sordid picture of how the
United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices
for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war.”).
2. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Recovers over $3.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal
Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-
billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/4NTY-YHFL].
3. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. Between 2009 and 2016, the DOJ recovered $19.3 billion in FCA settlements and
judgments related to health care fraud. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SIGNIFICANT
FALSE CLAIMS ACT SETTLEMENTS & JUDGMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2009-2016 (2016), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/918366/download [https://perma.cc/D6T2-45ZU].
6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 2.
7. See id. 
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money for fraudulent claims, it also imposes enormous risk and
liability on health care providers8 struggling to understand and
weave through the minefield of government regulations.9
In 2016, the FCA landscape was altered. After debate among the
lower courts, the United States Supreme Court held in Universal
Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar that implied
false certification was a viable FCA liability theory.10 Under this
theory, FCA liability can attach to a health care provider who fails
to disclose noncompliance of any regulatory, contractual, or statu-
tory requirement—as such failure may constitute presentation of a
“false or fraudulent claim.”11 By validating this theory, the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of the FCA, an Act that was already
formidable in magnitude and risk for health care providers faced
with constantly evolving and complex regulations.12 Additionally,
the post-Escobar uncertainty of the implied false certification
theory’s implications heightened the concern for liability under the
FCA.13
While Escobar increased the scope of liability for health care
providers, it also developed a potential defense for defendants fac-
ing FCA liability.14 The Court focused on materiality as a basis for
liability, stating that the government’s payment practices after
8. The FCA does not define health care providers, but other federal provisions offer a
definition. This Note will rely on the definition found in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 262, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(3) (2012)). Under the Department of Health and
Human Service’s interpretation of HIPAA, a “health care provider” is “a provider of services
..., a provider of medical or health services..., and any other person or organization who
furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103 (2017).
9. Initially in 1986, FCA violations were subject to civil fines of $5,000 to $10,000 per
claim plus treble damages. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). Recently, pursuant to the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015, the DOJ adjusted for inflation those FCA civil penalties assessed after
January 15, 2018, to between $11,181 and $22,363 per claim. See Civil Monetary Penalties
Inflation Adjustments, 83 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3945 (Jan. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 85).
10. See 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016).
11. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012)); see also Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687,
697 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing and describing the implied false certification theory).
12. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns that Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers: Has the
Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity for the Health Care
Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1228-29 (2018).
13. See id. at 1230-32.
14. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04. 
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obtaining actual knowledge of any noncompliance can be used to
determine whether such noncompliance qualifies as a material vio-
lation.15 Thus, the Supreme Court effectively created a defense for
FCA violators in situations in which the government has knowledge
of a violation but continues to make reimbursements or payments.16
This Note provides health care providers and others facing
potential FCA liability under the implied false certification theory
with a strategy for reducing or negating liability. The Escobar de-
cision examined the interplay between potential FCA violations and
the government’s conduct—specifically, its payment practices.17
Voluntary self-disclosure is the process by which individuals or
companies disclose potential violations to the government18 in order
to qualify for reduced penalties under the FCA.19 This Note argues
that such disclosure can be used in certain circumstances to for-
mulate a defense against FCA liability by providing the government
with actual knowledge of noncompliance and using the govern-
ment’s subsequent payment practices to determine whether the
noncompliance was material.20
Part I of this Note introduces the FCA, including the breadth of
the Act and the various theories of liability that fall under it,
focusing considerably on the implied false certification theory. Part
II reviews the debate over the implied false certification theory
among the courts, which wrestled with the viability and the scope
of the theory but ultimately held the implied false certification
theory is valid. Part II then elaborates on the materiality standard
developed by the Supreme Court and discusses how courts have in-
terpreted this standard in subsequent cases.21 Part III of this Note
presents a strategy for defending against FCA liability. Specifically,
Part III demonstrates that voluntary self-disclosure provides the
15. See id. 
16. See id.
17. See id. 
18. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATED
OIG’S PROVIDER SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL 3-4 (2013), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-
disclosure-info/files/provider-self-disclosure-protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8D9-3UC2]
[hereinafter OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL]; see also Publication of the OIG’s Provider Self-
Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399, 58,399-400 (Oct. 30, 1998).
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012).
20. See infra Part III.A. 
21. See infra Part II.C.
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government with actual knowledge of noncompliance and argues
that observations of the government’s subsequent payment prac-
tices can be used as evidence to potentially negate liability for FCA
violations at the pleading stage. Lastly, Part IV details the risks
and benefits of voluntary self-disclosure and offers guidance on
determining when disclosure is in fact the best option.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The FCA—a Civil War “relic”—is now one of the government’s
most powerful tools against modern fraud and abuse.22 To better
understand its scope and complexity, this Part provides a basic in-
troduction to the FCA, specifically discussing the implied false
certification theory of liability.
A. General Liability Under the False Claims Act
The FCA, coined “Lincoln’s Law,”23 was enacted during the Civil
War.24 At that time, fraud was rampant throughout the United
States—government contractors supplied defective materials to the
Union, including substandard clothing, fraudulent supplies, and old
or disabled animals.25 While the FCA proved an effective measure
against fraud during the Civil War,26 amendments to the FCA in
1943 significantly limited its utility.27 However, Congress drastically
amended the FCA in 1986 after a series of significant and highly-
publicized accounts of fraud in the defense industry surfaced.28
These amendments increased financial incentives for whistleblow-
ers and expanded whistleblowers’ role by reducing a number of
22. Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic
Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 456 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Mgmt. Co. v. Heryford, 885 F.3d 629, 634 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018).
24. James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their
Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 35, 35-36 (1991).
25. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264-65 (2013).
26. See Helmer, Jr. & Neff, Jr., supra note 24, at 37.
27. See id. at 39-40.
28. See id. at 40-41, 44.
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barriers that had inhibited prior actions.29 Since the passage of the
1986 amendments, the FCA has grown exponentially,30 becoming
the federal government’s most effective tool in combatting fraud
and abuse in government spending.31
There are multiple provisions of the FCA, but the two most per-
tinent to this Note include: (1) the basic provision for liability, which
applies when someone “knowingly presents, or causes to be pre-
sented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”;32 and
(2) the provision prohibiting false records and statements, which
applies when someone “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim.”33 Additionally, the statute provides a definition
for “knowingly,” specifying that the standard is not just limited to
actual knowledge of fraud, but also includes deliberate ignorance
and “reckless disregard of the truth.”34 The statute further acknowl-
edges that liability does not require intent to defraud.35 Thus, when
a government contractor overcharges the government for provid-
ing goods or services, the contractor may violate the FCA;36 simi-
larly, if a health care provider submits a claim to Medicare for a
service that was not provided, regardless of his or her intent to do
so, the provider may be subject to FCA liability.37
The broad scope of the FCA is largely due to its qui tam provision,
which permits private citizens to bring actions on the government’s
behalf.38 Through this mechanism, a wide range of individuals,
rather than exclusively federal prosecutors, can file FCA suits; these
29. See id. at 44-50.
30. See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW (2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/918361/download [https://perma.cc/EP3A-CHJ5]
(presenting data that the total value of settlements and judgments related to fraudulent
government spending grew from $86,479,949 in 1987 to $4,761,357,835 in 2016).
31. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 25, at 1261-62.
32. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
33. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
34. Id. § 3729(b)(1).
35. See id. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
36. See id. § 3729(a)-(b).
37. See id.
38. See id. § 3730(b); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 787 (2000) (holding that relators have standing to pursue FCA claims). 
2019] AN IMPLIED DEFENSE TO FCA LIABILITY 1949
individuals are known as relators or whistleblowers.39 The govern-
ment benefits from this scheme because qui tam relators can dis-
cover fraud related to government spending at a greater level than
the government could on its own;40 relators benefit by receiving a
large portion of the proceeds.41
The 1986 FCA amendments significantly increased the benefits
for qui tam relators, which effectuated enormous growth in FCA
actions and FCA liability.42 In 1987, relators brought only 8 percent
of FCA claims through qui tam suits; more recently, in 2016, qui
tam plaintiffs brought 83 percent of FCA claims.43 Whistleblowers
are commonly employees or former employees of defendants who
“often file qui tam lawsuits to get even for the wrongs they believe
they have suffered or are experiencing at work.”44 Though opinions
of whistleblowers are mixed, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, author
of the 1986 amendments, emphasized his views on the importance
of whistleblowers in identifying fraud: “No matter what we do to
deter waste and fraud, whistleblowers are the key to the govern-
ment finding out when that act happens.”45 
B. The Implied False Certification Theory of Liability
The main provision of the FCA imposes liability when an individ-
ual submits a “false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to
39. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Consequently, a provider’s “competitors, employees, and
patients or their representatives” can initiate an FCA action. Joan M. Krause, Reflections on
Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that “Counts” Under the False Claims
Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1816 (2017). 
40. See 161 CONG. REC. S6103 (daily ed. July 29, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(“Whistleblowers have always been crucial in helping Congress and the Federal Government
root out fraud and misconduct.”). 
41. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). If the government intervenes and proceeds with the
action, then the relator may receive between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds. Id.
§ 3730(d)(1). If not, then the relator may receive between 25 and 30 percent of the proceeds.
Id. § 3730(d)(2).
42. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30; Helmer, Jr., supra note 25, at 1273-75.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30.
44. Jesse A. Witten & Patrick H. Thompson, Avoiding Qui Tam Lawsuits by Properly
Handling Disgruntled Employees: There Are a Number of Ways that Providers Can Mitigate
Risk, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Sept.-Oct. 2015, at 31, 31.
45. False Claims Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2014) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
1950 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1943
the government or government program.46 The requisite “false or
fraudulent claim” is not defined in the FCA, but has been inter-
preted to mean both “factually false” and “legally false” claims.47
Historically, most health care FCA cases were based on straightfor-
ward “factually false” misrepresentations,48 “which involve[ ] an in-
correct description of goods or services provided or a request for
reimbursement for goods or services never provided.”49 “Factually
false” claims arise when there is a misrepresentation about the
items or services themselves.50 For example, reimbursement claims
for medical services never provided would qualify as “factually false”
claims.51
Federal prosecutors and qui tam relators can also invoke the FCA
against “legally false” claims.52 These “legally false” claims arise
when there is a false certification of compliance with a federal stat-
ute, regulation, or contract provision.53 Thus, in the health care
context, “legally false” claims may arise when an item or service has
been provided to patients, but an underlying federal rule was vio-
lated, such as nonadherence to a Medicare requirement for partici-
pation.54
Complicating the FCA further, courts often divide the theory of
legal falsity into two parts by distinguishing between express cer-
tification and implied certification.55 Under the theory of express
certification, a defendant can be subject to FCA liability by falsely
certifying “compliance with a particular statute, regulation, or
46. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also Mason v. Medline Indus., Inc. 731 F. Supp. 2d 730,
736 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
47. E.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
48. E.g., United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217
(10th Cir. 2008) (“In a run-of-the-mill ‘factually false’ case, proving falsehood is relatively
straightforward.” (quoting Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697)).
49. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (citing Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of
the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51
ALA. L. REV. 105, 111-12 (1999)).
50. See id.
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 696-97.
53. See id. at 697; see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274 (“[A] false claim may take many forms, the most common being a
claim for goods or services not provided, or provided in violation of contract terms,
specification, statute, or regulation.” (emphasis added)).
54. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696-97.
55. See, e.g., id. at 697-702 (examining the allegations under both theories).
2019] AN IMPLIED DEFENSE TO FCA LIABILITY 1951
contractual term” when such “compliance is a prerequisite to
payment.”56 This false certification relating to a claim may be made
through any express means, including “a certification, assertion,
statement, or secret handshake.”57
In contrast to the express certification theory, the implied false
certification theory treats a claimant’s request for payment as an
implied certification of compliance with all relevant statutes, regu-
lations, or contract requirements that are material conditions of
payment.58 Under the implied certification theory, failure to disclose
a violation of any material requirements is treated as a misrepre-
sentation that renders the claim “false or fraudulent.”59 In her ar-
ticle on white collar crime and the FCA, Professor Joan Krause em-
phasized the implied certification theory’s impact on the scope of the
FCA: “Implied certification extends FCA liability from straightfor-
ward false statements of compliance to potentially any failure to
comply with the larger universe of federal program rules, even if
they are not explicitly reflected in any compliance statement.”60
Because the implied false certification theory had such a large
impact on the scope of the FCA, the courts heavily debated its
viability. 
II. THE IMPLIED FALSE CERTIFICATION THEORY IN THE COURTS
The implied false certification theory first appeared in a 1994
case, Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States.61 In Ab-Tech, the
government received statutory damages against a small business
that failed to obtain the Small Business Administration’s (SBA)
requisite approval.62 The court found that the payment vouchers
Ab-Tech had presented impliedly certified adherence to the SBA
program’s participation requirements, and thus violated the FCA
56. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217
(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698).
57. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).
58. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1218.
59. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
1995 (2016).
60. Joan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit Got Wrong, 68
S.C. L. REV. 845, 849 (2017).
61. 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 433-34 (1994).
62. Id. 
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when such requirements were in fact unmet.63 Consequently, Ab-
Tech’s introduction of the “implied certification” theory sparked a
debate over the theory’s viability that would not be resolved for
over twenty years.64 This Part discusses that debate, focusing first
on the various interpretations among the lower courts and later
discussing the Supreme Court’s Escobar holding, which ultimately
validated the theory but narrowed its use through its definition of
“materiality.”65
A. The Lower Court Debate
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, lower courts
had mixed views on the viability of the implied false certification
theory of FCA liability. One side of the spectrum held the FCA
should never apply to express or implied certifications.66 Holders of
this view believed government agencies, not the courts, were in con-
trol of and responsible for regulating and sanctioning individuals
and entities that made false certifications.67 Other courts thought
that the FCA should impose liability only on false certifications
involving an express condition of payment.68 Finally, applying the
FCA most broadly, many courts held FCA liability should extend
beyond express conditions of payment and include implied certifica-
tions as well.69 The Supreme Court took on Escobar to answer this
63. Id. at 434. 
64. The Ab-Tech decision, decided in 1994, introduced the implied certification theory to
the courts. See id. This theory was then debated in lower courts, until it finally arrived at the
Supreme Court in 2016. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998-99.
65. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995-96.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 712 (7th Cir. 2015). 
67. See id. (“[U]nder the FCA, evidence that an entity has violated conditions of par-
ticipation after good-faith entry into its agreement with the agency is for the agency—not a
court—to evaluate and adjudicate.”).
68. See, e.g., Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Mikes v. Straus, 274
F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]mplied false certification is appropriately applied only when
the underlying statute or regulation ... expressly states the provider must comply in order to
be paid.”).
69. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 513
(1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]hile the district court concluded that only claims premised on misrep-
resentation of compliance with a condition of payment are cognizable under the FCA, we find
that any payment/participation distinction is not relevant here.”); United States v. Sci. Appli-
cations Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“This circuit has endorsed the im-
plied certification theory.”); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. 614 F.3d
2019] AN IMPLIED DEFENSE TO FCA LIABILITY 1953
heavily debated question over the viability of the implied false
certification theory.70
Yarushka Rivera was a teenage Medicaid beneficiary receiving
mental health counseling and treatment from Arbor Counseling
Services, a Universal Health Services subsidiary.71 Throughout a
five-year period of intermittent counseling, Rivera was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication.72 The prescribed
medication caused Rivera to suffer multiple seizures and ultimately
led to her death at the age of seventeen.73 Shortly after Rivera’s
death, her parents, Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa, discovered
that a number of the employees who diagnosed Rivera and pre-
scribed her medication were in fact unlicensed, unauthorized to
counsel patients, unauthorized to write prescriptions, and mostly
unsupervised despite compulsory state regulations requiring su-
pervision for unlicensed employees.74 With this information, Rivera’s
parents brought a qui tam action against Universal Health Services
based on a theory of implied false certification.75 Her parents alleged
that Universal Health Services violated the FCA by submitting false
claims to Medicaid—asserting that their claims were false because
they included provider and payment codes that implicitly certified
qualifications of the staff that they in fact lacked.76
The district court dismissed the complaint based on its interpre-
tation of multiple First Circuit decisions.77 It construed First Circuit
1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010).
70. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (“This case requires us to consider [the implied false
certification] theory of liability and to clarify some of the circumstances in which the False
Claims Act imposes liability.”).
71. Id. at 1997. 
72. Id. for a full discussion of Escobar, see generally Mark E. Haddad & Naomi A. Igra,
Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar, in TOP FOOD & DRUG CASES, 2016 & CASES TO
WATCH, 2017, at 67, 67-68, https://www.fdli.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/05/Top-Cases-2016-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6U2-QRZG].
73. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1997.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1997-98.
77. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. 11-11170-DPW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40098, at *13 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (“[T]he First Circuit repeatedly
confirmed that it does not recognize ... the ‘artificial categories’ of false claims used by other
circuits, such as ‘legally false’ as compared with ‘factually false’ or ‘express certification’ as
compared with ‘implied certification.’”); see also United States ex rel. Jones v. Brigham &
Women’s Hosp., 678 F.3d 72, 85 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[W]e rejected rigid divisions between factual
1954 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1943
precedent as extending liability only to defendants who misrepre-
sented compliance with a government program’s express condition
of payment.78 In Escobar, the regulations that Universal Health
Services’s employees purportedly violated were express conditions
of participation for the state’s Medicaid program—not express con-
ditions of payment.79 Thus, the district court granted the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss.80
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, determining that the dis-
trict court had misinterpreted the precedents on which it relied.81
The First Circuit held the submission of any claim by a billing party
constitutes implicit certification of compliance with all program re-
quirements—including both conditions of payment and conditions
of participation.82 The court determined that a billing party may be
liable under the FCA by falsely certifying compliance with a require-
ment even when the requirement is not explicitly deemed a con-
dition of payment.83 The First Circuit held that compliance with
Medicaid participation requirements was an implied condition of
payment, and therefore the Riveras’ FCA claims could proceed.84
While the First Circuit was clear in establishing the implied false
certification theory’s viability, not all circuits followed suit. Shortly
after the First Circuit’s decision, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
First Circuit’s broad interpretation of the theory.85 In United States
and legal falsity, and express and implied certification, noting that the text of the FCA does
not make such distinctions.”); New York v. Amgen Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“The only question presented ... is whether the claims at issue misrepresented compliance
with a material precondition of payment.”); United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone
Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385-86 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The text of the FCA does not refer to ...
‘express certification’ or ‘implied certification.’... In light of this, and our view that these
categories may do more to obscure than clarify the issues before us, we do not employ them
here.”).
78. See Escobar, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40098, at *15-16.
79. See id. at *17-19 (citing United States ex rel. Dyer v. Raytheon Co., No. 08-10341-
DPW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83335, at *9 (D. Mass. July 29, 2011)).
80. Id. at *40 (“The [FCA] ... [is] directed at materially false statements presented to
obtain government reimbursement. The Plaintiffs have not ... made adequate allegations
regarding such statements.”).
81. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 513-14
(1st Cir. 2015).
82. Id. at 516.
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 712 (7th Cir. 2015). 
2019] AN IMPLIED DEFENSE TO FCA LIABILITY 1955
v. Sanford Brown, Ltd., the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he FCA is
simply not the proper mechanism for government to enforce viola-
tions of conditions of participation contained in—or incorporated by
reference into—a [Program Participation Agreement].”86 Further-
more, even among the circuits that recognized the implied false
certification theory, the scope of liability under the doctrine was
disputed. On one hand, the Second Circuit imposed liability only if
a defendant’s false certification was an express condition of pay-
ment.87 But like the First Circuit, the Ninth,88 Tenth,89 and D.C.90
Circuits extended liability beyond express conditions of payment.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Universal Health Services v.
United States ex rel. Escobar
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Escobar to resolve the
implied false certification theory’s conflict in the lower courts.91 In
a unanimous decision written by Justice Thomas, the Court endors-
ed the implied false certification theory’s viability. At the outset of
the opinion, the Court held that “at least in certain circumstances,
the implied false certification theory can be a basis for [FCA] lia-
bility.”92 In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified that the
FCA is not limited only to fraudulent or false statements and mis-
representations, but also applies to misleading omissions.93 The
Court established that the implied false certification theory can cre-
ate liability when two conditions are met: “[F]irst, the claim does not
merely request payment, but also makes specific representations
about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant’s
86. Id. at 712 (citing Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001)).
87. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700.
88. See Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2010).
89. See United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1169
(10th Cir. 2010).
90. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
91. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998
(2016).
92. Id. at 1995.
93. Id. at 1999 (“When ... a defendant makes representations in submitting a claim but
omits its violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements, those omissions can
be a basis for liability if they render the defendant’s representations misleading with respect
to the goods or services provided.”).
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failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regula-
tory, or contractual requirements makes those representations
misleading half-truths.”94
By validating the implied false certification theory, the Court
effectively broadened the FCA’s already expansive reach; however,
in an effort to limit FCA liability exposure, the Court also estab-
lished a narrower and more demanding materiality standard.95 The
Supreme Court rejected the express condition of payment theory set
forth by many lower courts, cautioning that “[a] misrepresentation
cannot be deemed material merely because the Government des-
ignates compliance ... as a condition of payment.”96 Therefore, rather
than determining whether a requirement is an express condition of
payment, the opinion focused on whether the requirement is mate-
rial to the government’s decision to pay the claim.97 The Supreme
Court declared that the requirement for materiality is a “rigorous
one” and that plaintiffs must plead materiality with particularity
and plausibility to avoid summary judgment or dismissal at the
pleading stage.98 Consequently, the Supreme Court established ma-
teriality as the central method of proving falsity or fraud.99
The FCA statute defines “material” as “having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property,” and most courts had addressed this standard as
a general element of FCA liability.100 The Escobar Court expanded
on the materiality definition by reviewing the statutory, common
law, tort law, and contract law definitions independently, but con-
cluded that “[u]nder any understanding of the concept, materiality
‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient
of the alleged misrepresentation.’”101 To further clarify, the Court
94. Id. at 2001.
95. Id. at 1996.
96. Id. at 2003.
97. Id. at 2001 (“Whether a provision is labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but
not dispositive of the materiality inquiry.”). 
98. Id. at 2004 n.6.
99. See id. at 1996.
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
101. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting 26 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12,
at 549 (4th ed. 2003)). The Court began with the statutory definition and stated the statutory
definition descends directly from common law, and “the common law could not have conceived
of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.” Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22
2019] AN IMPLIED DEFENSE TO FCA LIABILITY 1957
established the following standard for determining whether a
condition is material:
[P]roof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited
to, evidence that the defendant knows that the Government
consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based
on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a
particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that
those requirements are not material. Or, if the Government
regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has
signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the
requirements are not material.102
Thus, the Court illustrated that materiality is a subjective stan-
dard, and the analysis is based on the unique facts of each case.103
With this guidance, the Court vacated and remanded the First
Circuit’s opinion.104
(1999)). The Court also looked to the tort law definition, which provides two circumstances
when something is material: 
(1) “[if] a reasonable man would attach importance to [it] in determining his
choice of action in the transaction”; or (2) if the defendant knew or had reason
to know that the recipient of the representation attaches importance to the
specific matter “in determining his choice of action,” even though a reasonable
person would not.
Id. at 2002-03 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1997)). Lastly,
the Court referred to the contract definition: “‘[A] misrepresentation is material’ only if it
would ‘likely ... induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent,’ or the defendant ‘knows
that for some special reason [the representation] is likely to induce the particular recipient
to manifest his assent’ to the transaction.” Id. at 2003 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 162(2) & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). In her article, Professor Krause stated
that “the problem is that these various conceptions of materiality, at least as applied under
the FCA, historically have not been treated as equivalent.” Krause, supra note 39, at 1833.
Krause argues that “the Justices rejected the payment-prerequisite standard as the defining
characteristic of implied certification, only to seemingly resurrect that standard as the core
of the materiality test.” Id. at 1833-34 (footnote omitted).
102. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04. 
103. See id. 
104. Id. at 2004. 
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C. Materiality in the Post-Escobar Courts
The Escobar decision ended the debate over the implied false cer-
tification theory’s viability, but it also sparked new debates over the
seemingly heightened materiality standard—specifically, when con-
sidering the government’s payment practices. Since the Escobar
holding, evidence that the government paid claims despite having
actual knowledge of the defendant’s noncompliance has been a
significant consideration in several district court and appellate
cases.
In a First Circuit decision post-Escobar, the court ultimately
affirmed a district court’s decision to dismiss a motion to amend the
complaint, holding that the claims presented were not adequately
pleaded.105 The main claim alleged that Onyx, the defendant medi-
cal device company, made fraudulent representations to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in seeking approval for its device.106
The court, however, held that the representations were immaterial
and, in keeping with Escobar, stated the “fact that [the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)] has not denied reimburse-
ment for Onyx in the wake of [the relator’s] allegations casts serious
doubt on the materiality of the fraudulent representations that [the
relator] alleges.”107
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants in United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co. based
on the materiality standard.108 In McBride, the plaintiff alleged FCA
violations by a government contractor for inflating headcount data
used to track the number of troops utilizing recreation centers at
various camps in Iraq.109 The court observed, “we have the benefit
of hindsight and should not ignore what actually occurred” and de-
termined “what actually occurred” was that the Defense Contract
Audit Agency investigated the allegations but continued to pay and
did not discontinue or disallow any charged costs.110 Thus, the court
followed Escobar and held that the government’s continued payment
105. See D’Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2016). 
106. Id. at 7. 
107. Id. 
108. 848 F.3d 1027, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1034.
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practices were “‘very strong evidence’ that the requirements al-
legedly violated ... [we]re not material.”111
In Abbott v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant after a former em-
ployee alleged that BP falsely certified compliance with various reg-
ulations.112 The court focused on the Department of the Interior’s
(DOI) actions after becoming aware of the allegations and found
that the DOI permitted BP to maintain operations.113 This permis-
sion was very influential in the court’s decision, which stated that
“[a]s recognized in Escobar, when the DOI decided to allow [BP] to
continue drilling after a substantial investigation into Plaintiffs’
allegations, that decision represents ‘strong evidence’ that the re-
quirements in those regulations are not material.”114
In United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., the
First Circuit also discussed the materiality standard and found that
some of the pleaded claims lacked materiality because the FDA
failed to withdraw, or even suspend, its approval of a medical device
after receiving knowledge of noncompliance.115 The relators alleged
that the defendant medical device company misrepresented the
safety and efficacy of one of its devices in order to secure FDA ap-
proval.116 However, the court, referencing Escobar, stated that con-
tinued payment or approval “becomes compelling when an agency
armed with robust investigatory powers to protect public health
and safety is told what Relators have to say, yet sees no reason to
change its position.”117
The materiality standard set forth in Escobar has also been
followed closely in the district courts. In City of Chicago v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., Chicago alleged that Purdue provided physicians
with misleading information regarding the risks associated with
opioids, thereby causing the submission of false claims.118 However,
111. Id. (citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 2003 (2016)).
112. 851 F.3d 384, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2017).
113. Id. at 388.
114. Id. (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04).
115. 865 F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2017).
116. Id. at 32-33. 
117. Id. at 35. 
118. 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
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the court followed the materiality standard: “The City argues that
it was unaware that claims were false when it paid them, but the
Court has difficulty understanding how the City remained unaware
that the claims were false after the lawsuit.”119 Similarly, in United
States ex rel. Kolchinsky v. Moody’s Corp., the district court dis-
missed an FCA claim alleging that the defendant participated in a
practice of issuing false or inflated credit ratings that negatively
impacted nationwide financial markets prior to the 2008 financial
crisis.120 The court dismissed the complaint, largely based on Esco-
bar’s materiality standard, because the government continued to
pay the defendant despite awareness of the alleged credit reporting
fraud during the time period.121
While the trend in the lower courts favors viewing materiality via
the standard set forth in Escobar—placing great weight on govern-
ment conduct after awareness of noncompliance—a minority of
courts have ignored the Supreme Court’s standard. In both the First
and the Ninth Circuits, the appellate courts chose to consider the
government’s payment practices as observations to be considered,
but not factors dispositive to materiality.122 In considering Escobar
on remand (Escobar II), the First Circuit gave little weight to the
payment practices of the government and instead focused on the
centrality of the licensing and supervision requirements to Massa-
chusetts’s health program.123 The Ninth Circuit also decided against
the Escobar standard of materiality in United States ex rel. Campie
v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.124 In that case, it was undisputed that the
government continued payments after becoming aware of the
defendant’s noncompliance with FDA regulations, but the court was
persuaded by the plaintiff ’s arguments that “to read too much into
the FDA’s continued approval—and its effect on the government’s
119. Id. at 1079.
120. 238 F. Supp. 3d 550, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
121. Id. at 558-59.
122. See infra notes 123-25.
123. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc. (Escobar II), 842
F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2016) (“While it may be the case that MassHealth continued to pay
claims to UHS despite becoming aware that they were not in compliance with the pertinent
regulations at the Arbour facility ... at this time Relators have stated a claim under the FCA
sufficient to survive a Motion to Dismiss.”).
124. 862 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2017).
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payment decision—would be a mistake.”125 Nevertheless, these
decisions remain in the minority, and most courts have followed the
Supreme Court in viewing the government’s conduct as strong ev-
idence of materiality.
III. GOVERNMENT PAYMENT PRACTICES AS A DEFENSE TO LIABILITY
In Escobar, the Court explained that when the government has
actual knowledge of noncompliance, its subsequent payment prac-
tices qualify as strong evidence in determining whether the non-
compliance at issue is material.126 This Part discusses voluntary
self-disclosure, a procedure that essentially provides the govern-
ment with actual knowledge of noncompliance, and how such pro-
cedure can be used to potentially form a defense against FCA
liability.
A. The Demand for Increased Compliance Procedures and Self-
Disclosure
The Escobar decision irrefutably guaranteed one thing: the im-
plied false certification theory is a valid basis for FCA liability.127
Because of this decision and the expansion of the FCA, legal
scholars and corporate counsel have urged companies within gov-
ernment-regulated industries to ramp up compliance efforts in
anticipation of the implied false certification theory’s undoubted
effect on these businesses.128 Although focusing on compliance and
auditing procedures is critical for avoiding violations, it is also an
essential tool for identifying significant noncompliance and
125. Id. at 905-06.
126. See 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003-04 (2016).
127. Id. at 2001.
128. See Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The Impact of the
Supreme Court’s Ruling in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
19 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 97, 112-13 (2017) (“In order to mitigate any potential exposure to a
potential allegation of noncompliance, healthcare providers will need to adjust and/or adopt
an effective internal compliance program and implement external audit program.”); Attorneys
Dish on Escobar’s FCA Impact One Year Later, LAW360 (June 16, 2017), https://www.law360.
com/articles/932786/attys-dish-on-escobar-s-fca-impact-one-year-later [https://perma.cc/TX85-
BZ8E].
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aggressively defending against any potential liability.129 In light of
the Escobar decision and the materiality standard established
therein, voluntary self-disclosure of identified noncompliance can
be used to formulate a strong defense against false claims liabil-
ity.130 At a minimum, voluntary self-disclosure can offer numerous
benefits by reducing the consequences that stem from FCA lia-
bility.131 However, more thoroughly discussed here is how voluntary
self-disclosure may assist in forming a defense to avoid FCA liability
entirely.
Voluntary self-disclosure is the process by which health care
providers, or other individuals and entities subject to civil mone-
tary penalties, voluntarily disclose evidence of potential fraud.132
Voluntary self-disclosure may bring forth benefits in the FCA con-
text, regardless of whether liability is imposed.133 Although the FCA
levies colossal damages liability, enforcement agencies may discount
penalties for individuals who self-disclose.134 Both the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)135 and CMS136 encourage providers’ voluntary disclo-
sure of potential FCA violations. Additionally, the FCA itself con-
tains a provision discussing the reduced penalties for individuals
who voluntarily disclose.137 Thus, voluntary self-disclosure has two
overarching benefits: (1) upon a finding of noncompliance, self-dis-
closure can lead to reduced consequences;138 and (2) self-disclosure
129. See Howell, supra note 128, at 112-13.
130. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012); see also Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
131. See infra Part IV.B; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
132. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEMIANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 46 (2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/semi
annual/2017/sar-fall-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN9X-KSMC]; see also OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE
PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 3-4.
133. See infra Part IV.B; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
134. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
135. The OIG utilizes the OIG’s Self-Disclosure Protocol (SDP). OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE
PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 1-2.
136. CMS utilizes the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP). See Self-Referral Disclosure
Protocol, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-
Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Self_Referral_Disclosure_Protocol.html [https://perma.cc/5AUY-
77QK] (last updated June 7, 2017, 10:57 AM). The SRDP should be used exclusively for the
disclosure of conduct related to Stark Law violations and is less applicable to this Note. See
id.
137. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). 
138. See infra Part IV.B; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
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may present circumstances that provide an individual with a strong
defense to liability.139 This latter benefit is more pertinent to this
Note.
Voluntary disclosure provides the government with actual knowl-
edge of noncompliance. As discussed, the Escobar Court emphasized
the utility of observing government payment practices to determine
whether noncompliance is material.140 The Court stated that the
government’s decision to make payments or reimbursements despite
having actual knowledge of noncompliance may be used as strong
evidence that a violation is not material.141 When a violation is im-
material, there is no FCA liability.142 Thus, by self-disclosing, an
individual can quickly determine whether noncompliance is mate-
rial based on the subsequent actions of the government.
Ultimately, voluntary self-disclosure produces two outcomes. If
the government continues to pay despite having actual knowledge
obtained by the disclosure, then that subsequent payment can be
used as a defense against liability.143 This defense can be brought
forth at the pleading stage and result in a successful motion to
dismiss or summary judgment.144 Conversely, the government may
decide to stop payment based on the noncompliance.145 While this
generates a less desirable outcome—as the discontinued payments
would establish evidence of materiality—the decision to voluntarily
self-disclose would still be beneficial.146 Voluntary self-disclosure
likely would lead to reduced damages for material noncompliance
that could have resulted in much heftier fines and also would allow
providers to avoid additional consequences of liability.147
139. See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 2003-04 (2016). 
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 2002.
143. See id. at 2003-04.
144. See id at 2004 n.6.
145. See id. at 2003.
146. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012).
147. See id.; infra Part IV.B.
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B. Government Payment Practices Allow for Liability Avoidance 
at the Pleading Stage
Materiality can be viewed as a legal question—a question that a
judge can answer at the pleading stage.148 Therefore, the pleading
stage seems to be the most appropriate place to bring forth the FCA
defense of the government’s continued payment practices. Despite
its sweeping scope, FCA allegations require plaintiffs to plead with
particularity,149 which is an exacting standard.150 This standard is
required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”151 In
footnote six of the Escobar opinion, the Court gave clear guidance
that the pleading stage was an appropriate place for dismissal of
FCA claims based on materiality.152 The Court stated:
We reject Universal Health’s assertion that materiality is too
fact intensive for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a
motion to dismiss or at summary judgment. The standard for
materiality that we have outlined is a familiar and rigorous one.
And False Claims Act plaintiffs must also plead their claims
with plausibility and particularity under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 9(b) by, for instance, pleading facts to support
allegations of materiality.153
With this guidance, many courts have affirmed dismissals at the
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment stages.154 In
148. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6.
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386
F.3d 235, 242 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical
Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,
19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994). 
150. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 1992) (FCA claims require a
plaintiff to “plead (1) a specific false representation of material fact; (2) knowledge by the
person who made it of its falsity; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom it was
made; (4) the intention that it should be acted upon; and (5) that the plaintiff acted upon it
to his damage.” (citing Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Tr., 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983))).
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
152. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6.
153. Id.
154. Grants of motions to dismiss were affirmed in the following cases: United States ex
rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 493-94 (3d Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Kelly
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United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., the D.C. Circuit
Court discussed this standard further, stating that to avoid dis-
missal at the pleading stage, the plaintiff “must show that a rea-
sonable factfinder, drawing all justifiable inferences from the
evidence in her favor, could find that [the defendant] violated a con-
tractual or regulatory requirement that was material to the Gov-
ernment’s decision to pay.”155 Additionally, the plaintiff cannot
merely “rely on the allegations of her own complaint ..., but must
substantiate them with evidence.”156 The Southern District of New
York offered a succinct review of the requisite standard to plead
materiality at the pleading stage in United States ex rel. Kolchinsky
v. Moody’s Corp.:
To plead materiality with the requisite particularity, a relator
may draw inferences from various sources, including the
Government’s history of declining to pay claims for failure to
comply with the applicable regulation. By contrast, materiality
is absent at the pleading stage when the relator’s chronology
suggests that the Government knew of the alleged fraud, yet
paid the contractor anyway.157
Despite the clear guidance proffered by the Supreme Court in
footnote six158 and followed by many of the subsequent court de-
cisions, the DOJ believes that “it would be premature, at least at the
pleading stage, to impute agencies with ‘actual knowledge’ of
fraud.”159 In a Statement of Interest, the DOJ relayed its concerns
regarding the Court’s opinion in Escobar and the materiality
v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 337 (9th Cir. 2017); D’Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2016); United States ex rel. Whatley v. Eastwick Coll., 657 F. App’x 89, 97 (3d Cir. 2016).
Grants of motions for summary judgment were affirmed in the following cases: Abbott v. BP
Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. McBride v.
Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2017); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.,
840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016).
155. 848 F.3d at 1032 (citing United States ex rel. Folliard v. Gov’t Acquisitions, Inc., 764
F.3d 19, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
156. Id. (quoting Grimes v. Dist. of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
157. 238 F. Supp. 3d 550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citations omitted).
158. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
2004 n.6 (2016).
159. Statement of Interest of the United States in Connection with Relator’s Rule 59(e)
Motion to Alter Judgment at 5, United States ex rel. Kolchinksy v. Moody’s Corp., 238 F.
Supp. 3d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:12-cv-1399-WHP) [hereinafter Statement of Interest].
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standard articulated therein.160 The DOJ argued that without “ac-
tual knowledge” of fraud, whether a government agency chooses to
discontinue payment or change its course of conduct cannot be
viewed as “strong evidence” or “dispositive proof” of immateriality.161
While many of the post-Escobar court decisions have referred to
allegations and investigations as providing the government with
knowledge of fraud,162 that is not an issue of concern in this present
argument. By self-disclosing noncompliance to the government, pro-
viders or entities in violation of government requirements effectively
provide the government with actual knowledge of such violation.
Therefore, the government’s subsequent payment practices and
conduct would warrant strong evidence of materiality.163
Throughout its statement, the DOJ also consistently referred to
the “holistic approach” established within the Escobar decision,164
yet these words never appear in the body of the Escobar Court’s
opinion.165 In discussing the factors to make a “holistic” assessment,
the DOJ suggested consideration of,
inter alia, (i) whether the defendant’s misrepresentation or
omission goes to the “very essence of the bargain,” or is instead
“minor or insubstantial;” (ii) the defendant’s awareness that
disclosure of its misrepresentation would cause “the Government
[to] consistently refuse[ ] to pay claims;” and (iii) how the
Government has reacted to the same or similar types of miscon-
duct when it had “actual knowledge” of them.166
The DOJ provided numerous reasons why government practices
are insufficient in determining materiality and, instead, relied
almost exclusively on whether something went to the essence of
the bargain.167 Though the Supreme Court did not offer an exact
160. See id. at 3.
161. Id. at 5.
162. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., Statement of Interest, supra note 159, at 3.
165. See generally Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (omitting a “holistic approach” in the opinion).
166. Statement of Interest, supra note 159, at 4 (first alteration in original) (emphasis
omitted).
167. Id. at 7-8.
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definition of materiality,168 the Court did concretely establish gov-
ernment payment practices as strong evidence of materiality.169
Conversely, and almost as an aside embedded in the middle of a
lengthy footnote, the Supreme Court quoted a 1931 New York case
in which “a misrepresentation [was considered] material if it ‘went
to the very essence of the bargain.’”170 This reference was made
solely when analyzing the various definitions of materiality and was
not established as a chief component of materiality.171 As a result,
a majority of subsequent court cases have followed the Supreme
Court’s guidance on materiality, placing significant emphasis on the
government’s payment practices172 rather than the unsubstantiated
“holistic approach” referenced by the DOJ.173 
Through self-disclosure, a defendant is able to provide the govern-
ment with actual knowledge, a factor discussed by both the Supreme
Court and the DOJ.174 A defendant can then use the government’s
subsequent payment practices as strong evidence to determine ma-
teriality.175 If the government continues to pay a claim or fails to
alter its conduct, then the defendant should not be found liable
under the FCA because the plaintiff ’s claim lacks materiality.176
Conversely, if the government stops payment or alters its conduct
after receiving the disclosure, then the defendant is still able to
lessen his or her liability and avoid additional consequences es-
tablished conjunctively with FCA actions.177
IV. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
Self-disclosure is not without risk, and health care providers
should weigh the benefits and risks before deciding whether to opt
or decline to voluntarily disclose noncompliance. This Part provides
a cost-benefit analysis of self-disclosure in order to assist providers
168. See supra text accompanying note 102.
169. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
170. See id. at 2003 n.5. (citing Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400 (1931)).
171. See id. at 2002-03, 2003 n.5.
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See Statement of Interest, supra note 159, at 4.
174. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04; Statement of Interest, supra note 159, at 4.
175. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
176. See id. 
177. See infra Part IV. 
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in determining whether voluntary self-disclosure is the best course
of action.
A. Voluntary Self-Disclosure Is Not Without Risk
There are several costly and time-consuming risks associated
with self-disclosure.178 Because there is no amnesty from FCA civil
and/or criminal liability or waiver of damages in exchange for dis-
closure, the consequences of voluntary self-disclosure remain un-
certain.179 The OIG expressly refuses to provide any assurances in
advance regarding the manner in which it will resolve any volun-
tary self-disclosure:
Because a provider’s disclosure can involve anything from a
simple error to outright fraud, the OIG cannot reasonably make
firm commitments as to how a particular disclosure will be
resolved or the specific benefit that will enure to the disclosing
entity. In our experience, however, opening lines of communica-
tion with, and making full disclosure to, the investigative agency
at an early stage generally benefits the individual or company.180
While providers can look to past actions and settlements, self-
disclosure cases are decided on a case-by-case basis and are wide-
ranging—between 30 and 100 SDP settlements are reached each
year181 and the range of settlements lies anywhere between less
than $10,000 to less than $10 million.182 Because the government is
not bound to resolve the noncompliance issue in any particular
178. See Stacy L. Brainin et al., Internal Investigations in Health Care: Unique Enforcement
Environment and the Dilemma of Disclosure, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 421,
440-42 (Brad D. Brian et al. eds., 4th ed. 2017).
179. See id.
180. Publication of the OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399, 58,400
(Oct. 30, 1998).
181. Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 439.
182. Id.; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 132, at 46 (“During this
semiannual reporting period, [April 1, 2017 to September 30, 2017,] provider self-disclosure
cases resulted in $12.6 million in HHS receivables.”).
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manner,183 providers take the risk of uncertainty when deciding to
disclose.184 
Perhaps the largest risk is cost. In this Note, the main goal of
discussing disclosure is to formulate a defense against liability,185
thereby eliminating costly damages;186 however, if the government
decides that a disclosed violation is material, then FCA liability
would still attach187 and thus, costs should be a consideration from
the outset. Many argue that the penalties for those who self-disclose
are too great and that health care providers who voluntarily disclose
noncompliance should be given greater protections against lia-
bility.188 One would expect that self-disclosure would require re-
payment of any overpayments;189 beyond that, providers may still be
faced with high settlement amounts that include multipliers.190
However, this is often limited to a multiplier of 1.5,191 rather than
the treble damages that frequently accompany undisclosed FCA
violations.192
Another concern is that self-disclosure will trigger a government
investigation that could uncover other noncompliance or violations
that were not disclosed.193 Through self-disclosure, a provider essen-
tially invites the government to inquire into different and broader
areas than the initial disclosure covered,194 and to refuse such
183. See OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 12-15.
184. See Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 440-41; Jeremy M. Sternberg & William F.
Pezzolo, Voluntary Disclosure: Risks & Benefits, AHLA CONNECTIONS, July 2017, at 24, 25-26,
https://www.healthlawyers.org/News/Connections/Documents/2017/Feature/July17_Fea
ture2.pdf#search=Self%2DDisclosure [https://perma.cc/25ET-A5W3].
185. See supra Part III.
186. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012).
187. See supra Part II.
188. See, e.g., Oversight of the False Claims Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1-2 (2016)
(statement of Rep. Trent Franks). U.S. Congressman Franks encouraged the government to
increase incentives for self-disclosure, stating: “The FCA has been successful because it’s
provided whistleblowers with a tremendous financial incentive for uncovering and disclosing
false claims. It should be possible to complement the current incentives for whistleblowers ...
with financial incentives for self-disclosure to uncover even more waste, fraud, and abuse.”
Id. at 2.
189. See Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 440 n.102.
190. See id. at 440.
191. See OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2.
192. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
193. Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 441; Sternberg & Pezzolo, supra note 184, at 26.
194. Sternberg & Pezzolo, supra note 184, at 26.
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inquiries would be to go against the essential cooperation stan-
dard.195 In his article, lawyer Robert Salcido stated that “any
disclosure is fraught with risk.”196 Salcido then continued to clarify
the risk, stating that “[i]f a company submits a Voluntary Disclosure
it will, necessarily, be handing over documentation to the federal
government that indicates that it may have violated federal rules
and regulations governing the healthcare program and then trust
the government to settle the matter on fair, even-handed terms.”197
Specifically, the government protocols for disclosure state that
matters that are uncovered during the verification process will be
treated as new matters outside of the disclosure.198 Accordingly, self-
disclosure does not offer protection against spin-off litigation, and
the benefits of disclosure could be eviscerated should the govern-
ment learn of nondisclosed issues.199 Thus, it is imperative that
providers perform a comprehensive internal investigation prior to
self-disclosure.200 Additionally, cooperation may require providers
to disclose privileged work product to the OIG or investigating
agency;201 protection of attorney client privilege adds another risk
that providers must weigh prior to disclosure.202
The OIG or agency that received the disclosure also may elect
to implicate the DOJ under its civil or criminal authorities.203 The
DOJ is not guaranteed to agree with the OIG’s decision in response
to the self-disclosure, adding even greater uncertainty to the risk
analysis.204
195. Id.
196. Robert Salcido, The Use of Voluntary Disclosures to Pre-Empt Qui Tam Actions Under
the False Claims Act: An Analysis of the Bank of Farmington Case and the OIG’s Voluntary
Disclosure Program, HEALTH L. DIG., Apr. 1999, at 3, 8.
197. Id.
198. See Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 441.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 440.
204. See id.
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B. The Benefits of Voluntary Self-Disclosure
A substantial benefit of self-disclosure, discussed extensively
throughout this Note, is the possibility of creating a defense based
on the government’s payment practice after disclosure.205 However,
there are a number of benefits of disclosure that extend beyond
creating evidence against FCA liability.
1. Reduction in Costs and a Streamlined Process
Voluntary self-disclosure can significantly lower the damages re-
quired to be repaid to the government.206 As discussed previously,
the FCA allows courts to grant reduced damages when providers
engage in voluntary disclosure.207 In its protocol, the OIG reiterated
that individuals who make a good faith effort to cooperate with the
government deserve to pay lower damages, and thus, the OIG typ-
ically requires a multiplier of 1.5, rather than the FCA’s treble
damages.208
Additionally, an individual who chooses to disclose often retains
more control over the situation.209 Through self-disclosure, a health
care provider is able to shape and frame the content of the violation
in a way that is beneficial to the provider.210 By offering a thorough
disclosure, the government is much less likely to conduct its own
investigation.211 Self-disclosure allows a provider to engage in a pro-
cess that is cooperative with the government rather than adver-
sarial.212 The OIG has emphasized its commitment to working with
disclosing providers and has implemented procedures to facilitate
timeliness in resolving such matters.213
205. See supra Part III. 
206. See OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2.
207. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012). 
208. See OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2; see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1).
209. See Sternberg & Pezzolo, supra note 184, at 25.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 27.
212. Id. at 25.
213. See OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2-3.
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2. Avoiding Permissive Exclusion and Corporate Integrity
 Agreements
Liability under the FCA typically gives rise to liability under
section 1128 of the Social Security Act.214 Under this section, the
OIG can use its discretion to determine if a provider should be ex-
cluded from federal health care programs, such as Medicare and
Medicaid.215 This presents one of the most devastating consequences
to providers who engage in fraudulent practices, as exclusion forbids
federal health care programs from paying for any items or services
provided, ordered, or prescribed by excluded individuals.216 Though
exclusion is meant only to serve as a remedial measure aimed at
protecting against fraud, it can create severe and long-term conse-
quences for a provider and his or her practice.217
The question of whether to exclude often arises from FCA vio-
lations, and the OIG has discretion as to whether to impose ex-
clusion under section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act.218 In
determining whether to exercise its discretion, the OIG presumes
that some “period of exclusion should be imposed against a person
who has defrauded ... [a] [f]ederal health care program.”219 However,
this presumption is rebuttable in certain circumstances, including
when a provider agrees to create and follow a corporate integrity
agreement (CIA), or when a provider “discloses the fraudulent
conduct, cooperatively and in good faith, to [the] OIG.”220
A CIA is a comprehensive compliance regime that is often nego-
tiated between a provider and the OIG upon learning of fraudulent
conduct.221 While CIAs are meant to improve and promote health
214. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CRITERIA FOR
IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1128(B)(7) EXCLUSION AUTHORITY 1 (2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/
exclusions/files/1128b7exclusion-criteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXH7-6HRH].
215. See id.
216. Stephen Robert Geisler, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations of Federal Law,
51 ALA. L. REV. 375, 383-84 (1999). 
217. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 214, at 1.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1-3.
221. Corporate Integrity Agreements, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp [https://
perma.cc/MJ96-YXMB].
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care compliance rather than to instill punishment, they are often
viewed as one of the most powerful weapons in the OIG’s arsenal.222
CIAs as an enforcement tool are typically used in combination with
FCA civil settlements between the government and a health care
provider.223 A CIA often lasts five years and subjects a provider to
a number of requirements that establish monitoring, auditing, and
reporting standards.224 While CIAs are beneficial in allowing a pro-
vider to avoid permissive exclusion and, consequently, continue
participating in federal health care programs, CIAs’ requirements
are extensive and extremely costly.225
Self-disclosure provides a rebuttal against the OIG’s presumption
for permissive exclusion and requirement of a CIA.226 The OIG has
stated: “[W]e believe that good faith disclosure of potential fraud
and cooperation with OIG’s review and resolution process are typ-
ically indications of a robust and effective compliance program.”227
Thus, the OIG is likely to forego the CIA requirement and also
waive permissive exclusion when a provider chooses to voluntarily
disclose.228 Between 2008 and 2013, the OIG resolved 235 SDP cases
through settlements, and in all but one of those cases the providers
were waived from permissive exclusion without requiring the exe-
cution of a CIA.229 Thus, regardless of outcomes, self-disclosure ben-
efits providers by allowing them to remain included in federal
222.  See Michael Rosen, Corporate Integrity Agreements: A Brief History, PROVIDERTRUST
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.providertrust.com/blog/corporate-integrity-agreements-a-brief-
history/ [https://perma.cc/572Y-TXF4].
223. Id.
224. CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENTS, supra note 221.
225. See id.; Rosen, supra note 222.
226. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 214, at 1-3.
227. OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2; see also Open Letter from June
Gibbs Brown, Inspector Gen., Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to
Health Care Providers (March 9, 2000), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/openletter.
htm [https://perma.cc/2HJY-HB9F] (“Perhaps the best evidence that a provider’s compliance
program is operating effectively occurs when the provider, through its compliance program,
identifies problematic conduct, takes appropriate steps to remedy the conduct and prevent it
from recurring, and makes a full and timely disclosure of the misconduct to appropriate
authorities.”). Gibbs further stated that self-disclosure often makes it so providers are not
required to have a CIA. Id.
228. OIG SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, supra note 18, at 2.
229. Id.
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programs and also avoid the costly and rigorous obligation of ex-
ecuting and adopting a CIA.230
3. Avoiding Liability Under the ACA’s Sixty-Day Rule 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires companies to report and
return government overpayments within sixty days.231 A company
or its officers may be excluded, suspended, or disbarred from gov-
ernment programs if these mandatory disclosures are not made in
a timely fashion.232 This was not necessarily an issue prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, and there remains uncertainty
regarding the types of noncompliance that result in overpayments
needing to be reported and returned.233 However, by affirming the
viability of the implied false certification theory,234 the Supreme
Court created likely implications for overpayment liability as well.
If a company or individual receives payment but that payment is
later found to have been induced by fraud, then individuals could
be held liable under both the FCA and the ACA’s sixty-day rule.235
As stated in an article discussing Escobar and the sixty-day rule,
“where non-compliance creates half-truths that are material to the
government’s decision to pay a claim, such non-compliance may not
only predicate FCA liability, but also create overpayments that
must be reported and returned.”236
Self-disclosure, once again, allows individuals to avoid this li-
ability. Under a recently pronounced regulation, the overpayment
obligation is suspended when a provider engages in voluntary
230. See id.
231. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6402(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(2)
(2012).
232. Medicare Program; Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 81 Fed. Reg. 7654,
7655-56 (Feb. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 405).
233. Steven Chananie et al., The Overpayment Rule and the Implied False Claims Theory:
“What You Don’t Know Can Still Hurt You,” HEALTHCARE L. BLOG (July 13, 2016), https://
www.sheppardhealthlaw.com/2016/07/articles/centers-for-medicare-and-medicaid-services-
cms/the-overpayment-rule-and-the-implied-false-claims-theory-what-you-dont-know-can-still-
hurt-you/ [https://perma.cc/43K6-5GUV].
234. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
1995 (2016).
235. See id. at 2003-04; Chananie et al., supra note 233.
236. Chananie et al., supra note 233.
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disclosure.237 Once the OIG acknowledges receipt of the disclosure
and such disclosure is timely, a provider is not required to report
and return an overpayment.238 The obligation to return such pay-
ments also is suspended until the matter has been resolved.239
Observing the government’s payment practices would also be
beneficial for determining whether noncompliance was material.240
Through observations, one would know whether a payment qualified
as an overpayment that should then be reported and returned, or as
an appropriate payment based on the immaterial noncompliance.241
If the government changes its payment practices upon knowledge of
the violation, then the individual or company should anticipate hav-
ing to report and return the payment to avoid additional liability, as
any payment resulting from noncompliance was likely inappropriate
due to a material violation.242 However, if the government continues
payment, then the violation was likely immaterial and one can
assume that the payment was appropriate.243
C. To Disclose or Not Disclose
After all is said and done, whether to disclose or not disclose
remains an important question. Health care providers should first
weigh the risks and benefits before making a determination.244
Providers should be thorough in the internal investigations prior to
determining whether to disclose in order to identify any issues that
the government might uncover and to fully weigh the risks and
benefits of disclosure.245
In deciding whether to disclose, health care providers should
avoid disclosing minor or insubstantial noncompliance—the scope
of the FCA was not intended to extend to the enforcement of all
237. 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(b)(2)(i) (2017).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra Part III.A. 
241. See supra Part III.A.
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(2) (2012); Chananie et al., supra note 233.
243. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
2003 (2016).
244. See Brainin et al., supra note 178, at 443-44.
245. See id. at 444. 
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contracts, statutes, and regulations.246 While the Supreme Court
made it clear that “insignificant” violations should not provide a
basis for FCA liability, the Court did not detail what specifically
comprises such inconsequential noncompliance.247 Rather, while the
Court stated that “[m]ateriality ... cannot be found where noncom-
pliance is minor or insubstantial,” it did not further define what
specific noncompliance qualifies as “minor” or “insubstantial.”248
Therefore, health care providers and companies should monitor
which actions courts deem “minor” or “insubstantial” as implied
false certification cases progress in the courts.
Moreover, additional compliance procedures may aid in distin-
guishing between obviously small and insubstantial violations—
those which should be corrected but not necessarily disclosed—and
larger compliance issues that should be disclosed.
Professors Arlen and Kraakman also discussed other factors to
consider when deciding whether to self-disclose.249 In their article,
they specifically discussed the rate of detection and stated that
businesses “must ensure that ex post, after wrongdoing is detected,
the firm is better off reporting the misconduct—and accepting the
[costs of reporting]—than it is remaining silent and risking the
default sanction.”250 Thus, a provider must weigh the likelihood of
the government learning of the violation on its own with the cer-
tainty of a government investigation and the risk of the noncom-
pliance being determined a material violation.251
246. See United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir.
2010) (“The FCA is not a general ‘enforcement device’ for federal statutes, regulations, and
contracts.”); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he False Claims Act was
not designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all ... regulations.”).
247. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004. The Court noted that the FCA is not “‘an all-purpose
antifraud statute,’ or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory
violations.” Id. at 2003 (internal citation omitted).
248. See id. 
249. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 728 (1997). 
250. Id.
251. See id.
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While the decision to disclose is one that providers must make
carefully, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, voluntary
self-disclosure could allow a noncompliant provider or entity to
avoid FCA liability altogether.252
CONCLUSION
On the surface, the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar appeared
to be a loss for government-regulated industries, especially health
care. The FCA liability derived from the implied false certifica-
tion theory’s validity transformed the endless regulations and re-
quirements imposed on health care professionals into a compliance
nightmare.253 However, the Court presented a gift to providers by
establishing the materiality standard—providing those who fail to
comply with government regulations a potential defense against
liability.254
By disclosing noncompliance, health care providers can greatly
reduce the consequences that may stem from false claims liability,
and perhaps negate it altogether.255 The actual knowledge that the
government obtains from self-disclosure, as well as the govern-
ment’s subsequent payment practices, provide clarity on whether a
court will find a noncompliant act material.256 Therefore, to make
this clear prediction, health care providers should strongly consider
being transparent with the government, disclosing noncompliance,
and waiting to see the outcome. At a minimum, the defendant will
have a better understanding of whether its noncompliance was
material and will gain access to the benefits of self-disclosure; even
better, however, the defendant may equip itself with a strong
defense to negate liability completely.257
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